ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
Not only no, but fuck no. But he'll sign anyway, I think. And if he doesn't we'll probably replace him with Koke and be okay.
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FC Bayern München Thread [2012/2013]
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ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
Oh, also what's up Barcelona...
Aymeric Laporte to Bayern
Aymeric Laporte to Bayern
ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
Rumor is that we'll pay the fucking 36m Euro buyout clause. So we've taken two players and left them with 80m. I'd say that's reasonable.
Sir Didier Drogba
Head Official
Got Bayern are scumbags
ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
Arnau;3658959 said:
New news is that Bayern won't buy any defenders because it would make Badstuber's comeback more difficult. That is fucking stupid. He's been out for like 2 years, who knows if he'll ever be good again. It's not like he was Thiago Silva before his injury.
ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
That's front office. Pep has no reason to give Badstuber such a chance.
ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
I believe I have figured out the problem with Pep's Barcelona and why this particular manager needs to either realize this mistake and adjust, or seek out another club if he wants to win the Champions League again. It is in no way harsh on Pep, merely some pretty common sense thinking, but for the most part understandable why Pep or any other manager would default to a system that would benefit 99.9% of clubs yet is not right for this current Bayern side.
1) Defensive Stability is sacrificed
This part is two pronged. The first and most obvious way in which defensive stability is sacrificed is by pulling a defensive midfielder further up the pitch and using him in a more attacking role. This leaves only one defensive midfielder to cover an entire line on the field or more if the fullbacks are advanced (as they often are for this Bayern team). In a 4-2-3-1, how Bayern lined up last season, the 2 defensive midfielders offer a lot of defensive help, not only in the middle of the pitch, but more importantly on the wings where they can cover for fullbacks and double up against wingers without sacrificing numbers in the middle (as there is the other one to cover if they drift wide). A lone DM faces the decision of either helping his fullback (or covering for an advanced fullback) against a skilled/fast winger, or staying in the middle and preventing a midfielder from making a run right at goal. It's often a decision where you can't make a correct decision because the moment you help the wide open man gets the ball in the middle, or the moment you don't help the winger beats the defense and creates or scores a goal. This much is obvious.
What isn't as obvious, but equally important particularly for knockout round games, is that a more attacking side will cause an equal and opposite response from a savvy opponent; namely they will sit back even more and exploit the gaps that we already concede will exist solely based on there being less defensive oriented/focused players. Teams will compress into their half more, compress narrower, and park the bus making all but long shot goals virtually impossible. The more they sit back, the less they will be out of position. So in a sense, having 2 DMs invites the opposition out of their shell a little more because they won't be constantly under pressure and will also find it easier catching the team out of position defensively as there is an extra man back. So what the 4-3-3 does is invite the very kind of play that can exploit and defeat it, especially over 1 or 2 legs.
2) Benefit of the 4-3-3
So we have noted Pep's sacrifice of defensive and positional stability, but why does he do this? What does a club stand to gain by playing 4-3-3 instead of 4-2-3-1? Well, first of all, it gives possession and allows a club to attack. For most clubs a simple move to this formation can turn a team from reactive to positive and spark an increase in goals and entertaining football. Notice I said for most teams. The reason for this is that there are very few, I would argue 1-3, clubs in the world that can dominate possession without packing the midfield in such a way. And here lies the problem: Bayern are one of those clubs. Bayern can dominate possession already, in any formation, by virtue of their superior technique. Most clubs need to change their system and philosophy to dominate possession, and that is when a 4-3-3 is useful. However Bayern Munich are not one of those clubs, and as a result the 4-3-3 sacrifices defensive stability for no tangible or philosophical benefit. Paradoxically, throwing an extra man forward makes it more difficult to score because it will intimidate the opposition to such a degree that they will park the bus for 90 minutes to deal with all the attackers. Which in turn will cause the dominant team to press even more (or do nothing and pass sideways all game), which will open up gaps at the back to be easily exploited on the counter. Withdrawing back into a 4-2-3-1 does just enough that teams have to come out a little bit more, and it also concedes just enough extra possession to make this possible. Teams know they cannot beat a disciplined 4-2-3-1 (really a defensive tactic) as easily on the counter attack, so they need to push out more in possession. It also adds more unpredictability as to where the 5th attacker will come from: in a 4-3-3 it is always up the middle, in a 4-2-3-1 it can come from anywhere while defensive cover is still in place.
3) 4-2-3-1 to 4-3-3
I'll throw some stats out.
13/14:
Bundesliga:71.1% possession, 88.3% pass success rate, 87% Passes considered "short passes", 35% played in opposition third of the field (1st), 2.71 goals per game, 6% shots in 6 yard box, 0.65 goals allowed per game
Champions League:69.5% possession, 89.8% pass success rate, 87% Passes considered "short passes", 36% played in opposition third of the field (1st), 4% shots in 6 yard box, 2.18 goals per game, 0.82 goals allowed per game
12/13:
Bundesliga:63.6% possession, 87.4% pass success rate, 83% Passes considered "short passes", 32% played in opposition third of the field (1st), 8% shots in 6 yard box, 2.88 goals per game, 0.53 goals allowed per game
Champions League:54.7% possession, 84.9% pass success rate, 83% Passes considered "short passes", 31% played in opposition third of the field (5th), 10% shots in 6 yard box, 2.38 goals per game, 0.85 goals allowed per game
So what can we take from these statistics? It's hard to tell causes and effects from the stats alone, but I would posit that somewhere in the high 60s possession actually becomes a hindrance to success for a team; it boosts the time spent in the opposition third, but all that really means is that the opposition is sitting back in an extremely organized manner. Typically 47% of the game is played in the middle third, leaving ~28% to be spent in either attacking third if evenly split. North of 35 appears to be an indicator that teams are parking the bus and that your productivity will be hindered by all the defenders.
Bayern had far less possession last year, yet were more dominant in both scoring goals and defending them both domestically and in the Champions League (assuming Madrid scores in the second leg). Why is this? Well, one theory would be to look at the passing stats and we see a statistical difference from last year. Last season Bayern had 17% of their passes considered "long balls, crosses, or through balls" compared with 13% this year. These are more risky balls, but lead more to goals; they are also much more useful when a defense is more opened up as teams can cross over 80 times in a game without scoring if the opposition is packed in tightly enough (Man U). This is demonstrated with the Percentage of Shots in the 6 Yard Box stat. Last year was significantly higher than this season across the board because defenses were less packed, because of less possession, because of a more defensive tactic, which led to more shots in the 6 yard box, which led to more goals. Simple, really.
CONCLUSION
My theory, then, is that at a certain point you reach PEAK TECHNIQUE. This surpasses a world class level of control and passing ability from your players throughout the entire team and only Bayern and Barcelona have reached this point in the last probably 20 years. When you reach Peak Technique you are guaranteed to control the ball by virtue of your skill and ability to not make mistakes and give it away. At this point the manager must, ironically, stop focusing his plan on controlling the ball because it is guaranteed, and instead set his team up to dominate every other facet of the game which is not guaranteed. Defense should be stable and pragmatic, players should be fit and strong. The manager should not try to dominate the other phases by relying on this technique because as we have seen, past a certain point it is counter productive. No matter how good your team is, they will not ALWAYS have the ball and therefore cannot rely on passing and technique as a form of defense. Instead, the manager should hit peak technique and then try to maintain it while pushing his players to be pragmatic, calculating, and physically superior. DISCOURAGING "possession for the sake of possession" and unproductive passing realizing that giving the opposition the ball in harmless spots that you can control gives them more confidence to come out of their shell and is far preferable to conceding the ball unintentionally in dangerous spots. Creative and forward/risky passes should be encouraged.
It is my argument that Jupp Heynckes either realized what I am saying now, or he stumbled upon it, but regardless Heynckes took a team at, or very close to Peak Technique and lined them up defensively and played pragmatically. As a result, he created the greatest team of all time. I would argue that if you told a member of the late 60s Ajax to read my last paragraph they would also agree and say they were doing the same thing.
1) Defensive Stability is sacrificed
This part is two pronged. The first and most obvious way in which defensive stability is sacrificed is by pulling a defensive midfielder further up the pitch and using him in a more attacking role. This leaves only one defensive midfielder to cover an entire line on the field or more if the fullbacks are advanced (as they often are for this Bayern team). In a 4-2-3-1, how Bayern lined up last season, the 2 defensive midfielders offer a lot of defensive help, not only in the middle of the pitch, but more importantly on the wings where they can cover for fullbacks and double up against wingers without sacrificing numbers in the middle (as there is the other one to cover if they drift wide). A lone DM faces the decision of either helping his fullback (or covering for an advanced fullback) against a skilled/fast winger, or staying in the middle and preventing a midfielder from making a run right at goal. It's often a decision where you can't make a correct decision because the moment you help the wide open man gets the ball in the middle, or the moment you don't help the winger beats the defense and creates or scores a goal. This much is obvious.
What isn't as obvious, but equally important particularly for knockout round games, is that a more attacking side will cause an equal and opposite response from a savvy opponent; namely they will sit back even more and exploit the gaps that we already concede will exist solely based on there being less defensive oriented/focused players. Teams will compress into their half more, compress narrower, and park the bus making all but long shot goals virtually impossible. The more they sit back, the less they will be out of position. So in a sense, having 2 DMs invites the opposition out of their shell a little more because they won't be constantly under pressure and will also find it easier catching the team out of position defensively as there is an extra man back. So what the 4-3-3 does is invite the very kind of play that can exploit and defeat it, especially over 1 or 2 legs.
2) Benefit of the 4-3-3
So we have noted Pep's sacrifice of defensive and positional stability, but why does he do this? What does a club stand to gain by playing 4-3-3 instead of 4-2-3-1? Well, first of all, it gives possession and allows a club to attack. For most clubs a simple move to this formation can turn a team from reactive to positive and spark an increase in goals and entertaining football. Notice I said for most teams. The reason for this is that there are very few, I would argue 1-3, clubs in the world that can dominate possession without packing the midfield in such a way. And here lies the problem: Bayern are one of those clubs. Bayern can dominate possession already, in any formation, by virtue of their superior technique. Most clubs need to change their system and philosophy to dominate possession, and that is when a 4-3-3 is useful. However Bayern Munich are not one of those clubs, and as a result the 4-3-3 sacrifices defensive stability for no tangible or philosophical benefit. Paradoxically, throwing an extra man forward makes it more difficult to score because it will intimidate the opposition to such a degree that they will park the bus for 90 minutes to deal with all the attackers. Which in turn will cause the dominant team to press even more (or do nothing and pass sideways all game), which will open up gaps at the back to be easily exploited on the counter. Withdrawing back into a 4-2-3-1 does just enough that teams have to come out a little bit more, and it also concedes just enough extra possession to make this possible. Teams know they cannot beat a disciplined 4-2-3-1 (really a defensive tactic) as easily on the counter attack, so they need to push out more in possession. It also adds more unpredictability as to where the 5th attacker will come from: in a 4-3-3 it is always up the middle, in a 4-2-3-1 it can come from anywhere while defensive cover is still in place.
3) 4-2-3-1 to 4-3-3
I'll throw some stats out.
13/14:
Bundesliga:71.1% possession, 88.3% pass success rate, 87% Passes considered "short passes", 35% played in opposition third of the field (1st), 2.71 goals per game, 6% shots in 6 yard box, 0.65 goals allowed per game
Champions League:69.5% possession, 89.8% pass success rate, 87% Passes considered "short passes", 36% played in opposition third of the field (1st), 4% shots in 6 yard box, 2.18 goals per game, 0.82 goals allowed per game
12/13:
Bundesliga:63.6% possession, 87.4% pass success rate, 83% Passes considered "short passes", 32% played in opposition third of the field (1st), 8% shots in 6 yard box, 2.88 goals per game, 0.53 goals allowed per game
Champions League:54.7% possession, 84.9% pass success rate, 83% Passes considered "short passes", 31% played in opposition third of the field (5th), 10% shots in 6 yard box, 2.38 goals per game, 0.85 goals allowed per game
So what can we take from these statistics? It's hard to tell causes and effects from the stats alone, but I would posit that somewhere in the high 60s possession actually becomes a hindrance to success for a team; it boosts the time spent in the opposition third, but all that really means is that the opposition is sitting back in an extremely organized manner. Typically 47% of the game is played in the middle third, leaving ~28% to be spent in either attacking third if evenly split. North of 35 appears to be an indicator that teams are parking the bus and that your productivity will be hindered by all the defenders.
Bayern had far less possession last year, yet were more dominant in both scoring goals and defending them both domestically and in the Champions League (assuming Madrid scores in the second leg). Why is this? Well, one theory would be to look at the passing stats and we see a statistical difference from last year. Last season Bayern had 17% of their passes considered "long balls, crosses, or through balls" compared with 13% this year. These are more risky balls, but lead more to goals; they are also much more useful when a defense is more opened up as teams can cross over 80 times in a game without scoring if the opposition is packed in tightly enough (Man U). This is demonstrated with the Percentage of Shots in the 6 Yard Box stat. Last year was significantly higher than this season across the board because defenses were less packed, because of less possession, because of a more defensive tactic, which led to more shots in the 6 yard box, which led to more goals. Simple, really.
CONCLUSION
My theory, then, is that at a certain point you reach PEAK TECHNIQUE. This surpasses a world class level of control and passing ability from your players throughout the entire team and only Bayern and Barcelona have reached this point in the last probably 20 years. When you reach Peak Technique you are guaranteed to control the ball by virtue of your skill and ability to not make mistakes and give it away. At this point the manager must, ironically, stop focusing his plan on controlling the ball because it is guaranteed, and instead set his team up to dominate every other facet of the game which is not guaranteed. Defense should be stable and pragmatic, players should be fit and strong. The manager should not try to dominate the other phases by relying on this technique because as we have seen, past a certain point it is counter productive. No matter how good your team is, they will not ALWAYS have the ball and therefore cannot rely on passing and technique as a form of defense. Instead, the manager should hit peak technique and then try to maintain it while pushing his players to be pragmatic, calculating, and physically superior. DISCOURAGING "possession for the sake of possession" and unproductive passing realizing that giving the opposition the ball in harmless spots that you can control gives them more confidence to come out of their shell and is far preferable to conceding the ball unintentionally in dangerous spots. Creative and forward/risky passes should be encouraged.
It is my argument that Jupp Heynckes either realized what I am saying now, or he stumbled upon it, but regardless Heynckes took a team at, or very close to Peak Technique and lined them up defensively and played pragmatically. As a result, he created the greatest team of all time. I would argue that if you told a member of the late 60s Ajax to read my last paragraph they would also agree and say they were doing the same thing.
ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
Nice little win today. Win it all for Tito!
ShiftyPowers
Make America Great Again
Yeah me too
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